respects, a net diminution in the boundary of the free speech clause for those without money to pay' as against the enlarged prerogatives of those with the means to advertise. 9 The nascent revolution of Millian autonomy has been altogether checked and the "penumbras" of rights "emanating" from the ninth amendment have been reined in.' 0 Most conspicuously, the procedural due process explosion in administrative law has bumped up against a very tough doctrinal barrier: entitlements to some kind of hearing are newly dependent upon a fulcrum of "property," and, evidently, what constitutes property depends upon the pleasure of the state.'"
On the other hand, the Bivens case1 2 -which held that the Bill of Rights provides private causes of action-is unquestionably one of the most significant positive-law developments in the entire history of the Bill of Rights. Though it appeared early in the decade, it was nonetheless a feature of this decade of constitutional law. Similarly, the abortion decisions were also civil liberties decisions of the 19 7 0s. 13 Judging them merely from the criticism levelled by moderates of constitutional law alone, 4 they may reasonably be described as resting far from a conservative view of the Bill of Rights. Finally, One may try other kinds of comparisons, but they, too, lack both novelty and importance. In comparison with the last decade of the Warren Court, for instance, without doubt the work of this decade has been less aggressive. In comparison with nearly any other decade of Bill of Rights interpretations, on the other hand, this last one is probably virtually as generous as any previous ten years of decisions (and, of course, the "jurisprudence" of the Warren Court has been the object of intense criticism). In the thoughtfulness, care, and professional excellence of the Justices, so close are we to each decision as it comes down that our own parsing of its logic prematurely leads us to the supposition that the members of this court may somehow be less learned, less careful, or less judicious in superintending the Constitution than their predecessors. I personally do not think that this is so. To the contrary, I am inclined to believe that with only a few exceptions of the past, the ability, acuity, and detachment of the twelve Justices who have served since 1969 will, on sober comparison, overall compare very well. The well publicized voyeurism of The Brethren,' 1 6 incidentally, may be unintentionally instructive that there is nothing fundamentally amiss on the Court in this regard. Despite myriad personal revelations and despite the glimpses of private utterance and of unkind epithet, it is interesting that no scandal, no single instance of corruption, no incident of wrongdoing was unearthed. Even more, the revealed maneuvers of one Justice to influence another, to secure opinion-writing prerogatives, etc., are inadvertently reassuring: the Judges evidently care a great deal about their work and they do not regard the adjudication of constitutional law lightly. If studies of other departments of our national government were so ultimately empty of disturbing findings as were the best investigative efforts of Woodward and Armstrong into the Supreme Court, I do not think we would feel embarrassed but, instead, rather surprised. For these reasons, I have found it exceedingly difficult to discern something distinctive or doctrinally telegraphic in the civil liberties adjudications of the past decade-with one exception. Finally, yet still by way of introduction, I want to identify that exception.
The "liberties" mentioned in the preceding thumbnail review include most of those individual liberties in vogue in contemporary conversation: freedom of speech, of the press, of religion; freedom of personal life style, freedom from intrusions by government; freedom from arbitrary modes of determining one's fate (whether in civil or in criminal proceedings). These are matters which, in a political context, we might associate with the resolute commitments of organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union with its informal motto that its sole client is the Bill of Rights-liberal political concerns of expression, privacy, fair hearings, and the franchise. They are, as well, of course, the modes of liberty most stressed by the Warren Court.
The difference I see that most nearly distinguishes an entire pattern of decisions and of doctrinal development re-emerging within the past decade from those that immediately preceded it, however, is not revealed in comparing recent decisions with preceding ones in the unidimensionality of this comparison alone. It is, rather, by considering a larger group of cases and by relating them to a different, tighter, more conservative view of liberty: liberty as security of private property; liberty as freedom of entrepreneurial skill; liberty from the impositions of government and of third parties from disposing of "one's own." Liberty, in brief, more in the mode of John Locke 17 Fifteen years ago, in an excellent article, William Howard Mann devoted an unhurried 128-page review to the manner in which the Marshall Court protected these important economic freedoms 27 and I will not presume to summarize those developments still again. Rather, I mean but to observe that at least in comparison with recent decades past, the current decade has brought back from relative obscurity some of these clauses and some of this sense of commercial liberty. For instance, after a long eclipse signalled vividly in the Great Depression by the Blaisdell case, 2 8 the provision against laws impairing obligations of contracts has been revived and twice applied against abridging state legislation. 29 Similarly, in at least three instances state laws rather egregiously favoring local economic interests from fairer competition within a national market have been held invalid pursuant to the interstate privileges and immunities clause. 3° And again, in several instances the Court has not been content to wait for Congress to act against substantial stateimposed burdens on interstate commerce justified by rather marginal local interests, but has itself applied the commerce clause to hold those regulations unconstitutional.
Even the "takings" clause of the fifth amendment has experienced a recent revival in behalf of private property and entrepreneurial freedom. After a very close contest within the Court in which the clause was held not to be offended in the Penn Central case, 32 a decision in December 1979, did hold the clause applicable to forbid the government from imposing an-unpaid-for public servitude upon a valuable commercial development in Hawaii.
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None of these is a "revolution" in constitutional law and none is the least earth shattering either by itself or in combination with the other cases linked by common themes of private property, competition, a national market, and entrepreneurial freedom. Insofar as they tend to show that some of the "old" liberties have not yet wholly yielded to the social impulse to regulate or to redistribute, however, they are not unimportant. They do, moreover, seem to me to suggest a difference in emphasis from the more personal, more "Millian," liberties best known during the preoccupations of the Warren Court-as they also provide a context for what has become of those less property-bound liberties during the past several years. Indeed, for reasons I now intend to examine at greater length, I think these cases are circumstantially significant, furnishing a renewed emphasis upon entrepreneurial rights as an important civil liberty of the nineteen-seventies. In the not-distant past, not to have private property was quite frequently fatal to one's abstract freedoms. One may have had an abstract freedom of speech. To exercise it, however, he must stand in some place or speak over some medium. If he had no front porch of his own, he could not, on that account commandeer his neighbor's. Neither could he commandeer the state's. For the prevailing view, very well represented in an early decision by Justice Holmes, was that property under government ownership carried with it exclusionary prerogatives fully equivalent to those possessed by private parties. As long as the state merely cordoned off its own property, reserving public access for certain purposes only, and uniformly barring all persons equally from access for any other purposes, it was no more vulnerable to trespasses than a private owner.
III THE ENLARGEMENT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
Private property, its acquisition, ownership, and disposition, was thus the pivot of civil liberties. Though where nondisruptive picketing had been held to be constitutionally sheltered although it occurred within the boundary of privately-held land. The 1976 decision restored the exclusivity of private property prerogatives, finding insufficient verisimilitude between large, corporately-held shopping plazas and either public parks or complete company towns, for free speech freedoms to be applicable. The fact that Robins could make no argument based on the fourteenth or first amendments, whereas but two or three years earlier a similarly situated individual could almost surely have made a successful argument, is itself declarative of one significant judicial trend.
Without reliance upon those amendments, Robins did, however, rely upon a provision in the California Constitution, a provision phrased somewhat differently from the first amendment. 46 In a four-to-three decision, the 40 
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California Supreme Court agreed that the state constitutional provision was applicable to the shopping center, given its quasi-public characteristics, the virtual disappearance of any traditional downtown area as a place of common resort, and the nondisruptive character of Robins's activity. This, too, is not uninstructive respecting developments in civil liberties within the past decade: quite generally, as decisions from the Supreme Court have rebuffed or withdrawn previously-existing "rights," a number of state courts have reinvigorated moribund portions of their respective state constitutions to re-establish the line of protection under state law.
4 7 There was, in this respect as well, nothing newly remarkable in the California Supreme Court's treatment of the case.
What is remarkable, however, is that the case did not end here as one might suppose that it would. The meaning and applicability of the California Constitution being an issue of state law within the exclusive and final determination of that state's own highest court, one would suppose that no federal question would be present and thus there would be no basis for appeal from that court to the Supreme Court of the United States. 48 That reasoning assumes a great deal; it assumes that the liberty of private property is not sufficiently entrenched as to be protected by the fourteenth amendment from limitations imposed by a state constitution enabling third parties to come upon it for purposes of nondisruptive petitioning, at least when the property (as in this case) is otherwise open to public use, corporately-held, commercial in character, and functionally very much like a traditional center-of-town. In agreeing to hear Pruneyard, however, the Supreme Court now regards that question to be a substantial one. The questions framed for review are precisely those which I have identified .'9 This change of "questions" within a decade is breathtaking. When I was a Stanford law student in the mid-1950s, the question posed to me by Phil Neal in our course on constitutional law was one raised by the company town case of Marsh v. Alabama; 50 namely whether the first and fourteenth amendments would secure some degree of third party free speech in the newly-planned Stanford shopping center. Professor Neal appeared to imply that presumably those amendments would apply and events in the sixties seemed to make him an excellent prophet. The question now posed is dramatically different: whether it unconstitutionally abridges property rights insofar as, by force of state constitutional law, some degree of third party free speech is allowed at all. Regardless of the outcome on the merits in the Supreme Court, the resemblance to Lochner 5 1 (and to cases predating Euchid v. Ambler) 52 is not very strained. In the context of the decision of but a few weeks ago, holding that the imposition of a public servitude on a commercially-developed private harbor in Hawaii constituted an uncompensated "taking" of the property in violation of the fifth amendment, 53 the grant of review in the Pruneyard case is extremely telegraphic.
The linkage of free speech with private property is made clearer in other cases as well. In Pruneyard, the shopping center will argue in the Supreme Court not merely that substantive due process precludes the state from subjecting its property to forum uses by others; it is arguing also that its right to use its property in this (exclusionary) respect is also an aspect of the corporation's own freedom of speech-and thus the California Supreme Court is twice wrong in what it did.
5 4 The claim is no longer a frivolous one; an entire line of decisions emergent in the seventies provides excellent ground for the shopping center argument which links "speech uses" of private property, even in a wholly commercial setting, with increasingly-protected first amendment prerogatives of business enterprise. One such line of cases is that which has overruled one's own money or one's own resources respecting election to office or political issues at large. It is difficult to avoid the impression simultaneously that "property" made at least part of the difference in the opposite outcomes of the two principal "right of reply" cases of the past decade. In Red Lion Broadcasting, 5 9 a unanimous Court sustained a federal regulation compelling a privately-owned radio station to furnish cost-free reply time to an individual mentioned disparagingly in the course of a brief, fifteen minute program. In 1974, on the other hand, a unanimous Court held unconstitutional a similar state statute compelling a privately-owned newspaper to furnish cost-free reply space to an individual mentioned disparagingly in the course of a brief editorial. 60 One difference (not the only one, to be sure) was this: by statute, some decades earlier, Congress had presumed to assert national ownership over the airwaves, further providing that no person, company, or licensee could acquire any "property" in those airwaves-that, at most, they could receive a three year conditional license of use. 6 1 In Florida, there was, of course, no equivalent statute precluding conventional private ownership of the newsprint on which the Miami Herald was printed: that ownership was complete, it carried with it full first amendment protections, and the state right-of-reply statute was correspondingly an abridgment of the newspaper's private property rights and freedom-of-speech: to exclude access by third parties. It seems quite clear, then, that the security of private property as an extension of oneself and the corresponding liberty of free speech with respect to ownership dominion of that private property, is a clear and powerful development of the seventies. As several of these cases display, moreover, the development is very much related to the resurgence of entrepreneurial interests-a recrudescent faith in the superiority of the marketplace, limited not very much any longer by egalitarian themes from the first (or fourteenth) amendment but, rather, by the more restrained limits of the antitrust laws alone.
The importance of owning private property as the necessary-and-sufficient condition for free speech has been underscored in additional ways. As entrepreneurial prerogatives of expression have been reinvigorated, and as the contour of "state action" has been drawn back again to exempt private prop- erty from third party claims, 2 the dimensions of the public forum itself have also undergone considerable revision: they have shrunk. The result is that the first amendment is geographically less applicable even to state-owned property at the end of the seventies, as it is geographically less applicable (as imposing third party speech servitudes) to privately-held property as well. At least so long as the government does not utilize its proprietary dominion over its own property to "take sides" in public controversy, it may now forbid first amendment uses more substantially than was the case ten years ago. The point is well illustrated by the Court's decision on Greer v. Spock, 6 3 a 1976 decision upholding a flat handbilling ban imposed throughout a military base of enormous size, despite its crisscrossing by public roads, its germaneness as a place for the particular handbills, and the absence of incompatibility of the proposed handbilling with alternatives of more particular (but less inhibiting) regulation of mere time, place, or manner. 65 the recent jail access case. There, the issue as the majority of the Court attempted to frame it was whether members of the institutional press could assert greater information-seeking first amendment access rights than others. But the issue, as Justice Stevens noted, was also, that, assuming an investigative journalist could not claim any special access, i.e., a greater right of access than a representative of the NAACP (which was interested in the conditions within the jail as a result of one suicide and several letters of complaint from prisoners), whether the extent of the sheriff's severe restrictions on access were adequately justified as to either. The majority did not particularly press for an adequate justification respecting the extent of the sheriff's restrictions, as neither was the matter pressed with any vigor in the courtroom, pretrial closure case of Gannet Co. Greer, with related cases during the seventies, not insignificantly shrank the scope of publicly-owned property available for the exercise of free speech. Gannet, Houchins, and related cases not insignificantly restricted access to publicly-owned property which access may inform one's speech. There is in respect to each a sense of very heavy retrenchment: neither property "owned" by others nor property "owned" by the state is as widely available as decisions in the preceding decade appeared to imply 6 S-as constitutionally accessible for the exercise of first amendment liberties. Simultaneously, the free speech claims of private property, commercial property and entrepreneurial property are more important than before.
IV THE RE-EMERGENCE OF LOCKE IN THE ALLOCATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
Thus far, our examples respecting the importance of private property as the principal fulcrum for the practical exercise of civil liberties have been confined to liberties, such as speech, that we associate with the first amendment. The same theme respecting the importance of property (who owns it, who controls access to it, what conditions may be attached to its enjoyment) is equally evident in two other sets of cases. The first relates to privacy in the strict constitutional sense, i.e., fourth amendment search warrant requirements as a condition of state intrusion. The second relates to due process before personally fateful matters are adjudicated of an individual. Both have been newly treated with distinctions of property clearly in mind: not merely whether one has it, but by what means (and on what conditions) did one acquire it?
When the property one holds is held as a presumed consequence of earnings, exchange, skill, or thrift, it comes closer to the "rightness" of deserving full protection in a distinctly Lockeian sense. Then indeed it is one's own, in evident contrast with what one holds unearned and at public sufferance. The latter, not eagily defended on the basis of Locke's labor theory of (property) value, is less rightful in its entitlements. At least this point of view is evident in older cases of constitutional law-and now it has emerged once again. It ac- Wyman involved a warrantless search of a welfare recipient's apartment under pain of terminating public assistance if access were refused. Marshall involved a warrantless search of business premises under pain of civil fine if access were refused. In neither case was there probable cause to believe that evidence of illegal activity was to be found; in each, however, there was some reason for the government official to request access, as he did. In the first instance, it was to determine whether a welfare-assisted child was being maintained under reasonable conditions; in the second, it was to determine whether the conditions of the business premises were in compliance with standards of safety as prescribed by federal law. In the first, a majority of the Court concluded that the warrantless search could be enforced by terminating assistance if consent under duress were refused; in the second, a majority concluded that it could not be enforced under duress if consent were refused-and that a warrant would have to be secured.
A fourth amendment amenity, some kind of warrant, was constitutionally prerequisite for entry onto business premises. An equivalent amenity was not deemed constitutionally prerequisite for entry into the welfare recipient's apartment. The cases certainly cannot be reconciled on the thought that nonpublic areas of a business establishment are more protected by the fourth amendment than an apartment. 71 Neither, I think, can they be reconciled on the ground that the threat of a civil fine for nonconsent was more coercive in Barlow than the threat to terminate assistance in Wyman; nor in differing degrees of cause, appropriateness, or general "reasonableness" of the time, place, or manner of the proposed search. Rather, I believe the difference relates to distinctions we have already been noting at some length.
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The Barlow case involved private property, private enterprise, and warrantless administrative intrusions to determine whether regulations are being violated on those premises. Wyman involved warrantless administrative intrusions not to determine whether the welfare recipient was operating "her" property in conformity with the law; it was to determine whether the welfare recipient was living up to the conditions the state imposed as conditions of its largess. In the former case, there is the unarticulated assumption that the intrusion 69. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
71. The fourth amendment (as well as the third amendment) is explicit in its application to "houses," and applicable merely by way of sensible implication to other places. 72 . In what is surely one of his more trenchant dissents, Justice Marshall put the majority's "explanation" of its analysis in Wyman v. James as follows:
We are told that there is no search involved in this case; that even if there were a search, it would not be unreasonable; and that even if this were an unreasonable search, a welfare recipient waives her right to object by accepting benefits. I emphatically disagree with all three conclusions. cisions have thus made the connection between private property and personal liberty something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. They have done so by contributing to the certainty that those without personal rights in property have only the weakest and most tenuous claim to personal liberties-whether of speech, of privacy, or of due process of law. The Court's decisions now enable the government to be less generous than it was once required to be in respect to public property and liberty, even as they have also restored to private owners exclusionary prerogatives and entitlements of use that leave those without property of their own dramatically unequal in the possession of their more meager liberties.
Simultaneously, as Professor Grey outlines in his paper, 75 this Court also has been overall less tolerant of sheltering personal liberties offensive to majoritarian morality or conventional virtue, and even here its disposition displays a preference for the values of (middle-class) "property." 7 "I Commercial speech is newly protected; scatological utterances are newly censurable. Reputation has its compensable claims in renewed possibilities for large libel actions; speech must be correspondingly more carefully weighed, considered, and researched. 7 7 "Liberty" is less lively, less spacious, and a little less shared than in the decade preceding the seventies-the uses of that liberty are bound more tightly than before to the importance of property as an essential condition of its free exercise. The net effect is not that there is necessarily less constitutionally-protected liberty overall than there was a decade ago, but that that liberty has been reapportioned in ways that confirm the value of private property. 75 
